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Being a part of the international community has greatly 
altered the relations between different states. This article 
will focus on the concept of diplomatic immunity, and, 
specifically, functional immunity provided to state 
officials in the realm of international law. A thorough 
insight into the Vienna Convention regarding Diplomatic 
Immunity has furthered the scope of present research. 
Furthermore, a line of distinction is drawn between 
personal and functional Immunity. This paper will also 
take a look into the assumptions relating to functional 
immunity within international law and also evaluate its 
doctrinal approaches. Additionally, the legal ambit of the 
official Act, the importance for states to recognize 
functional immunity is also discussed. This article will not 
only talk about provisions established in law but also the 
customs which are adopted in relation to the functioning 
of rationemateriae. The possibility of weighing functional 
immunity alongside the states‟ civil and criminal 
jurisdiction is also evaluated in the concluding part. 
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Diplomatic immunity is a legal immunity granted to officials of a 
state or an international organization, who act on the order of the 
sending state in the territory of the receiving state. The said official 
is granted civil and criminal immunity from the jurisdiction of the 
receiving state. There is an added obligation on the receiving state 
to protect and aid the official in the completion of his mission.1 In 
other words, when a state (sending state) sends an official to 
another state (receiving state) to perform a task ordered by the 
Government, he is absolved of all the charges that may be brought 
during the course of completion of the said act. This immunity 
safeguards the official for the acts performed during the course of 
the duty. The inviolability of the officials which accompanies the 
immunity granted to them is recognized by most countries by the 
virtue of various treaties and conventions of the United Nations. 
Diplomatic immunity is not provided for the benefit of the 
individual but that of the state. The privileges of immunity are 
extended to officials not on the basis of their rank but on the basis 
of the work assigned to them by the sending state which is to be 
carried out within the receiving state. The concept of diplomatic 
immunity was quite ambiguous before the introduction of Vienna 
Convention in 1961 but post the Vienna Convention, most of the 
powers were codified thereby giving them a black letter form.  
2. Significance of the Vienna Convention 
The primary role of the Vienna Convention, 1961, is to keep a check 
on the grant of diplomatic immunity.2 The Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations of 1963 on the other hand, codifies the 
diplomatic and consular practices.3 This Convention provides the 
framework for the maintenance and termination of the diplomatic 
                                                          
1CLAUDIA H. DULMAGE, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY: 
IMPLEMENTING THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, 806 
(10th edn, case W. Res. J. Int‟l L, 1978). 
2 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, 500 UNTS 
95. 
3 Ibid. 
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relationship between the independent states based solely on their 
consent.4 More than 160 nations are parties to these treaties.5 This 
Convention provides immunity to officials on the basis of their 
ranks in diplomatic missions and consular posts in accordance to 
the need for such immunity, depending on the act which is to be 
performed.6 Its success is not only because it was framed by the 
International Law Commission, but also because of the presence of 
long standing principles of diplomatic laws and the efficient 
reciprocity of the general approbation against non-compliance.  
The key provision of this convention is regarding the declarations 
of persona non grata7of an official or a diplomat who has committed 
an offence. Its framework was structured in such a way that it 
provides guidelines for diplomats from sending states to be 
guarded in the receiving state by the third state. The United States 
Diplomatic and Consular staff in Tehran Case8, played an essential role 
in justifying most of the fundamentals of the convention. This 
further provided aid to the United States in preserving the support 
of the international coterie and affirming eventual liberation of 
diplomats, which was brokered by Algeria. This case highlights the 
need for reforms in relation to the rights of state officials within the 
ambit of functional immunity.  
3. Distinction between Personal and Functional Immunity 
At the outset, there exists the need to distinguish between the 
concepts of functional immunity and personal immunity.  In relation 
to Ratione Personae, it is noteworthy that irrespective of the scope 
                                                          
4EILEEN DENZA, VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (3rd 
edn., United Nation Audiovisual library of International Law 1, 2009). 
5 United Nation Treaty Collection, Treaty section, United Nation Treaty 
Convention on Diplomacy, 
<https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_n
o=III- 3&chapter=3&lang=en> (accessed 01.08.2017). 
6MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 506 (7rd edn, Cambridge 
University Press, 2014). 
7 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, article 9. 
8 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran Case (United 
States of America v Iran) ICJ Rep. 3(1980). 




and nature of the work assigned, it is based completely on the 
principles of symbolic sovereignty and non-intervention.9 This is 
central to the understanding of the reason why only limited 
officials are awarded such immunity.10 RationeMateriae, 
alternatively, works on two policies viz. responsibility to the state11 
and the ambit of official duty.12 The major distinction lies in the 
basis of the duration of immunity. Personal immunity operates till 
the mandate of the official is complete or, if he is an official acting 
on behalf of the state, then until he ceases to function. On the other 
hand, functional immunity is granted during their mandate and 
continues even after the completion of their mandate.  
The second distinction relates to the scope of its function. While  
personal immunity operates on both official and personal acts of 
the officials, irrespective of the nature of the act, functional 
immunity operates only in the realm of official acts of the 
concerned person. Functional immunity cannot be extended to 
instances wherein, the official acts beyond his official capacity and 
acts in his private capacity. The third distinction relates to the 
nature of the kinds of immunities. Personal immunity has a 
concordant view on the notion that official acts are accounted on an 
individual envoy and cannot be extended to the state, on whose 
behalf that official is acting and it has a procedural nature. 
Moreover, ratione personae is granted to limited officials, for e.g. 
Head of the State, Minister of foreign affairs and some diplomatic 
agents, who perform their duties in states‟ best interests. Functional 
immunity is of a divergent nature as scholars view rationemateriae 
to be based on the proposition that acts performed by the official in 
his official capacity cannot be attributed his individual person, but 
                                                          
9SIR ARTHUR WATTS, „THE LEGAL POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
HEADS OF STATES, HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS AND FOREIGN MINISTERS‟ , 13, 
247 (Recueil des Cours, 1994-III). 
10 United States v Noriega, 117 F 3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997, Supreme Court of 
USA). US government never recognized General Noriega (de facto ruler of 
Panama) as head of state. 
11TOMONORI, „THE INDIVIDUAL AS BENEFICIARY OF STATE IMMUNITY: 
PROBLEMS OF THE ATTRIBUTION OF ULTRA VIRES CONDUCT‟, 261 (Denver J 
Int‟l L and Policy, 2001). 
12Zoernsch v. Waldock 1 WLR 675, at 692 (1964). 
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rather to the state on whose behalf he is acting. Therefore, it 
possesses a substantive form extending purely from the theory of 
law. extension from law. These are the major distinctions between 
the two forms of immunities with regards to its power, duration, 
scope and nature. It is clear that personal immunity has more 
power and generally has more functions compared to functional 
immunity, therefore it is given only to limited class of state officials 
compared to state officials, who enjoy functional immunity. 
4. Major Assumptions Regarding Functional Immunity 
The question about the very existence and the scope of functional 
immunity leads to many assumptions which complicate the idea 
further. Firstly, it is assumed that certain conventional rules 
granting rationemateriae to state officials exercising official duties 
are present. The second basic assumption is regarding the official 
duty. It is assumed that the acts of the official are to be attributed to 
the state, not to the individual himself.13 The other assumption is 
that rationemateriae is not procedural but a substantial barrier 
precluding foreign courts from exercising jurisdiction over state 
officials. There is no general customary rule to understand 
functional immunity because in many controversial cases, officials 
were charged under the respective state‟s criminal jurisdiction 
despite the presence of functional immunity, while performing 
their official acts. The Rainbow Warrior case14is a case in point,in 
which officials were charged under criminal jurisdiction of foreign 
state and were convicted. In the above case, the state on whose 
behalf those officials acted, requested for functional immunity and 
had not authorized their conduct. This case made it evident that 
functional immunity is attributable to the states, even though the 
acts carried out by the officials were not consented to by them. 
The rationale behind functional immunity is still a point of 
ambiguity, but it is scholarly opinion that functional immunity 
safeguards state sovereignty. The main reason for granting 
functional immunity is not the conduct of the officials themselves, 
                                                          
13 Hazel fox, The law of state immunity, 353 (3rdedn, oxford international 
press, 2002).  
14France-New Zealand Arbitration Tribunal, (1990) I.L.R.500 82. 




but the respect for the sovereign state they represent. This is in 
consonance with what is embodied in the principle of par in parem 
non habet imperium. In different political views, it is said that the 
state takes the responsibility for the acts of the officials. State 
practice of attribution has many a time shown that, a state cannot 
exempt itself from attribution by waiving the immunity of such 
officials. The fundamental reason for waiver of immunity is to 
absolve the state of its liability. However, such waiver will be 
nullified because of the attribution rule, according to which even 
ultra vires acts are attributable to the state. This affirms that there is 
a dual responsibility on the state. The first is to protect officials 
from criminal jurisdiction, and second, to protect the state 
responsibility. Attribution of state responsibility to a state organ 
and exercise of criminal jurisdiction over foreign officials by virtue 
of the prospect of dual attribution of certain acts, was considered a 
reasonable explanation.15 The treaty rules of granting 
Rationemateriae to a certain category of state officials seems to be a 
desideratum instead of sovereign equality of state. In a recent 
judgment given in the case of Abu Omar, the court clarified the 
scope of consular functions for which immunity can be granted. It 
was observed that there should only be a limited number of 
consular duties covered by rationemateriae and limited 
administrative duties in accordance with the laws of the territorial 
state.16 The rationale enshrined in the convention regarding 
functional immunity does not seem to protect the state sovereignty, 
irrespective of the acts of the consuls. There is no general principle 
of functional immunity governing the state officials, neither is there 
a bar on criminal prosecution by the territorial state. Ultra vires acts, 
which are grave in nature, do not mean that those are non-
sovereign acts-it means those acts which cannot be incorporated in 
the functions which the officials are lawfully authorized to carry 
out by the state. 
                                                          
15Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980). 
16 „Abu Omar‟ case, General Prosecutor at the Court of Appeals of Milan v 
Adler and ors.ILDC 1960 (IT 2012) (Supreme Court of cassation, 2012).  
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5. Doctrinal Approaches Regarding Functional Immunity 
and its Flaws 
There are three major approaches regarding functional immunity. 
The first approach is the oldest and is of a generic and simplistic 
legal nature. It entails that functional immunity applies to all the 
state officials and their acts come under the ambit of official 
capacity.17 Other theories are based on the dogmatic method, 
derived from the conceptual premise that every official act of the 
official can be attributed to the state. While many scholars believe 
that it has to do more with the protection of the states‟ internal 
systems, some others believe that it is used in order to protect the 
principle of „non-interference‟ in matters related to the 
Constitution. A third set of scholars, however, believe functional 
immunity is a tool that is mostly used for the protection of the 
state‟s exclusive jurisdiction. This theory is based on an inductive 
approach, which prohibits the exercise of jurisdiction on foreign 
state officials. This theory, however, has a major flaw. There is a 
fundamental lacking in its argument as it is based on 
unsubstantiated principles and the application of these principles 
uniformly to all officials, irrespective of the nature of acts carried 
out by them.  
The second one is quite limited in its scope, as it covers a finite set 
of acts of the state officials. This approach works on the premise 
that functional immunity covers only international acts executed by 
state officials.18 This means that it covers the acts of officials, that 
are committed on behalf of the state, sealed with the authority of 
the sending state. In other words, this theory postulates that for the 
commission of these acts, the officials cannot be held personally 
responsible. It elaborates on the relationship between the state and 
the foreign official, with respect to functional immunity and norms 
of international law. It also bars acts that are based neither on 
federal duties nor on prohibited acts of international law. This has 
                                                          
17 Accountability in Foreign Courts for State Officials‟ Serious Illegal Acts: 
When Do Immunities Apply?, December 2016 International Justice and 
Human Rights Clinic, The University of British Columbia. 
18C. C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED 
BY THE UNITED STATES,821(Little, Brown & Co. 1945-I). 




created a loophole by denying the possibility of attributing 
individual responsibility, thereby making the states wholly 
responsible. The recent changes in international law have 
amalgamated the idea of individual responsibility with the state. 
However, only a few officials are awarded with functional 
immunity by virtue of their acts overseas, as it would be complex 
to include all officials of foreign state under functional immunity. 
The third approach is traditional and complex. It states that given 
the complex and fragile nature of functional immunity, there 
cannot be a single norm governing functional immunity. In simple 
terms, a concrete customary law cannot be applicable to all officials 
in the same way for their acts. It is a radical norm that changes with 
respect to different official and different acts. It depends on the 
kind of act performed by the state official concerning the act 
protected under functional immunity. A radical change in 
international law concerning functional immunity has evolved and 
has an effect of progressively reducing the application of the 
functional immunity. There is a slight difference between the 
application of functional immunity and personal immunity.  
These approaches of international law, derived from unproven 
assumptions, will only prove or impose a particular international 
norm on all state officials irrespective of act. It is therefore, 
necessary that relevant tests be developed in order to determine the 
class of state officials who may enjoy the power of immunity. There 
are several valuable consequences which follow the grant of 
immunity. It is therefore pertinent that the test for grant of 
immunity be rigorous. 
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6. The Legal Ambit of the Official Act 
The true meaning of the term “official act” and its extent consists of 
both legal and factual elements. It is a choice between judicial 
officers and their official acts, and, the sovereign equality of 
sovereign states. Whenever an act is performed in the light of 
sovereign authority, it will have undisputed functional immunity.19 
It is true that significance has been attached to acts committed in 
official capacity to such an extent, that a major consideration for the 
grant of rationemateriae depends on whether acts committed are 
within the official capacity of the individual concerned or not. 
International Law Commission reports and conventions have often 
said, „when the act of the official is grave in nature and is termed as 
international crime,‟ it should be a question of state sovereignty 
whether such an act comes under functional immunity.20  In the 
case of McElhinney v. Ireland,21where the officials‟ act on foreign 
territory was such that it was closely related to diplomatic 
relations, it was considered to be within the scope of functional 
immunity. With reference to this, it can be said whenever the act is 
of such a nature that it could defile the diplomatic relations 
between the states, the privileges of functional immunity would be 
available to the concerned person. 
Acts that are of such a nature so as to term them as international 
crimes, are also subject to functional immunity, since they are 
committed on behalf of the state. The International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) upheld this view in the case of Djibouti v France.22 It was held 
that the state should take responsibility for the acts of the state 
officials protected by the power of functional immunity, because 
officials are acting on their behalf and not independently. If an 
official is explicitly told to commit an act that amounts to an 
                                                          
19LORNA MCGREGOR, IMMUNITY V ACCOUNTABILITY: CONSIDERING THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE IMMUNITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 
TORTURE AND OTHER SERIOUS INTERNATIONAL CRIMES (Redress, 2005).  
20Report of the International Law Commission, 69th Session, 2017. 
21McElhinney v Ireland 123 ILR 73 (2001)  (European Court of Human 
Rights). 
22 Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Djibouti v 
France, ICJ Rep 177 (2008). 




international crime it will automatically be considered as an official 
act. The existing definition of the official acts comes from cases like 
the Arrest Warrant case,23 where it was held that immunity either 
personal or functional should be granted for the efficient 
performance of their functions on behalf of the state. In another 
case of Jones v United Kingdom,24it was held that official acts are 
those that are carried out under the official authority of the state. 
Since there is no statute which recognizes and facilitates the co-
existence of both, functional immunity and individual criminal 
responsibility, the applicability and framework of the former is 
rendered extremely rigid. The judgment in the Arrest warrant case 
cleared many important doubts on the topic. It was held that 
crimes committed by the officials are not to recognized as 
operations undertaken on behalf of the state. Similarly, in the 
dissenting opinion given in the case of Germany v Italy25 it was held 
that crimes committed are not part of state functions.  
Furthermore, domestic or political crimes committed on foreign 
soil can be termed as official acts if committed on behalf of the 
state. State authorized or state sanctioned acts for officials are their 
sole duty, and obstructing the performance of such acts will narrow 
the scope of the functional immunity. Crimes committed on behalf 
of the state should be attributable to the state itself, irrespective of 
them falling within the ambit of an official act. The consideration 
for the applicability of the functional immunity should solely 
depend on the circumstances. It is therefore necessary that, the 
applicability of functional immunity be decided on a case to case 
basis.  
 
                                                          
23 Arrest Warrant case, Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium, ICJ Rep 
75 (2002). 
24 Jones and Others v United Kingdom, 53 ILM 540 (2014) (European 
Court of Human Rights).  
25 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, Germany v Italy, ICJ Rep 99 
(2012) (Judge Cangado Trindade). 
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7. The Importance of States’ Consent in the Grant of 
Functional Immunity 
The consent of a sovereign state plays an essential role in the 
fundamental functioning of the rationemateriae. The very roots of 
rationemateriae stem from the consent of the sovereign states. As in 
the case of Schooner Exchange,26the judges were of the view that an 
exception to sovereign immunity must be traced back up to states 
consent itself. In essence, sovereign immunity is granted to the state 
and not to the individual. It is the state which then extends this 
immunity to its officials acting in other states. States consent to the 
grant and recognition of functional immunity as it is mutually 
beneficial. Consent, therefore, is an absolutely necessity in order to 
enforce the privileges of functional immunity. A disagreement on 
the principle of immunity between the sovereign states concerning 
sovereign equality and general principles of international law, will 
produce uncertainty.   
Consent can be expressed or implied. When implied it holds less 
authority. The most important step towards a change in the system 
of functional immunity can be initiated when sovereign states work 
together in order to relax the authority of such immunity. This is 
especially necessary when the situation is grave in nature, harming 
international relations and sovereign equality. States cannot 
possibly argue to defend the officials in case of grave international 
crimes, as it will not only harm the accountability between the 
states, but also disrupt the international community as a whole.  
8. The Operation of Functional Immunity in Civil and 
Criminal Jurisdictions 
8.1 Immunity from Civil Jurisdiction 
There are three approaches to analysing civil jurisdiction and 
functional immunity through case laws. The first category of cases 
is where officials were denied functional immunity in a blunt 
                                                          
26 The Schooner Exchange v McFadden, 11 US 116, 135 (1812), (Supreme 
Court of United States, Marshall CJ). 




manner.27 Herein, the officials are not given a chance to negotiate 
and the civil courts give their final order regarding such immunity. 
The next is of those, where the courts didn‟t directly deal with the 
presence of any customary laws on rationemateriae, but stressed on 
their authority over the officials and indirectly denied the presence 
of any such immunity.28 The last set of cases is where the courts 
have awarded functional immunity to officials and considered it of 
equal value as that of the immunity of the state. In these cases, it 
was recognized that functional immunity granted to officials is not 
individual power, but that which is extended by sovereign states to 
the officials to work in furtherance of the welfare of the state. Some 
countries have their own laws that award officials with functional 
immunity,29 which protect them in the fulfillment of their official 
acts. As mentioned in the European Court of Human Right case 
(ECHR) of Jones,30 where the court affirmed the presence of 
customary international norms, it was observed that functional 
immunity is to be provided to officials at least in civil cases. The 
presence or absence of civil jurisdiction is question of fact and not 
of law, as functional immunity will be covered for official acts. If an 
official commits any civil wrong in his official capacity, he will be 
immune from the institution of proceedings against himself as 
functional immunity will be awarded for such an act. Such 
immunity, however, will not be provided for acts which are not 
done in his official capacity. 
8.2 Immunity from Criminal Jurisdiction 
The relationship between criminal responsibility and functional 
immunity is complex and difficult to understand. It is made more 
complex when the norms of functional immunity prevent the 
victim from obtaining justice for the sole reason that the accused is 
                                                          
27Fenton Textile Association Limited v Krassin, 1 Annual Digest Rep 
Public Intl L Cases  295-298 (1922). 
28Samantar v Yousuf and ors. ,147 ILR 726 ff (2012). 
29State Immunity Act of the United Kingdom 1978, State Immunity Act of 
Canada 1985. 
30CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JONES V UNITED KINGDOM: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS RESTRICTS INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR TORTURE, 47-
50 (30th edn, Utrecht Journal of International and European Law 30, 2014). 
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protected by functional immunity.31 In general, the grant of such 
immunities hinder the path of the victim to access justice as the 
grant of immunity extinguishes any substantive right that the 
victime may have. Generally, the courts deny functional immunity 
to officials charged with international crimes. These also include 
espionage, for which the dispute of Cyprus and Israel can be used 
as a reference. In this case, two Israeli officials were charged of 
espionage in Cyprus and were sentenced by the court.32 Serial 
breaches of law of war are also included herein, as is obvious from 
the observation in the case of Von Lewinski.33 The unlawful 
trespassing of a foreign territory is also an example of the same. 
The Arrest Warrant case34played a major role in denying functional 
immunity to officials. Functional immunity, accordingly, is limited 
to state officials acting in their official capacity. Functional 
immunity, therefore, is inapplicable to acts done by the officials in 
their personal capacity. In the prominent case relating to functional 
immunity, Prosecutor v Blaskic,35 the judges unanimously held that, 
if the concerned person acts in his official capacity, those acts are 
not imputable to them individually, but to the state on whose 
behalf they acted. It was further observed that the state would be 
held responsible even if the said crimes constituted International 
crimes. However, the Arrest Warrant case was of the contradictory 
viewpoint, wherein it was held that officials should be prosecuted 
in foreign courts alone for the crimes committed by them in their 
individual capacity and not for those which were done in their 
official capacity.36 
                                                          
31 Waite and Kennedy v Germany, 118 ILR 121 (1999). 
32Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, Application no. 25965/04, Council of 
Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 7 January (2010). 
33 Inre Von Lewinski,vol. 16 Annual Digest Rep Public Intl L Cases 509 ff 
(1949).  
34 Arrest Warrant case, Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium, ICJ Rep 
75 (2002). 
35 Prosecutor v Blaskic, Case No IT-95-14-AR108, 29 October, (1997), 
(International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Appeals 
Chamber). 
36 Arrest Warrant case (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium), ICJ 
Rep 3, [61] (2002). 




On the contrary, some courts have formulated that functional 
immunity does not apply to official‟s part of international crimes. 
An example for the same is the case of Belgium v Senegal37where 
former president of Chad Mr. H. Habrؘe dealt with international 
crimes regarding torture, during his presidency. It was Belgium‟s 
contention that both states being party to the Convention against 
Torture and other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment,38Belgium has have violated Article 7, of the 
Convention which says that parties to this convention are obliged 
to “prosecute” or “extradite” anyone who has committed any 
inhuman crime. Belgium filed an application before the ICJ. The 
court was of the opinion that functional immunity cannot be 
absolute and cannot be granted even in instances where inhuman 
crimes have been committed. The Court also believed that Senegal 
was at fault by providing asylum to the former President of Chad, 
under the pretext of immunity. 
There are, however, exceptions for functional immunity and 
criminal jurisdiction on state officials. It is substantially clear that 
functional immunity cannot be availed for the typical exercise of 
governmental functions that will not be attributable to the state. 
The above mentioned case not only criticized the actions of nations 
providing shelter to officials who are the offenders of grave crimes 
but also limited the boundary of functional immunity. Grave 
international offences cannot be regarded as acts covered under 
official duty, as those acts are neither ordinary state functions nor 
acts that states can perform solitarily. In the case of Germany v 
Italy,39 the court was of the view that functional immunity cannot 
assuage the grave nature of the international crimes committed 
outside the purview of the official duty, as they had been 
committed in private capacity. 
                                                          
37 Questions relating to the obligation to prosecute or extradite (Belgium v 
Senegal), ICJ Rep 422 (2012). 
38 Convention against Torture and other cruel inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, 1984. 
39 Jurisdictional immunities of the State (Germany v Italy), [2012] ICJ Rep 
99. 
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Both of the above mentioned ICJ judgments concur with the 
opinion that functional immunity is not extended to state officials, 
when any crime is committed in their official capacity. In crimes 
against humanity such as in the Eichmann Case,40functional 
immunity was denied, based on their act which was considered to 
be against the society. In the Kovtunenko Case,41the official was 
charged for the offence of defamation. In this case, even though it 
was established that the official was acting in his official capacity, 
functional immunity was denied. Furthermore, in other instances 
too, were grave crimes such as murder, abduction or terrorism 
were committed, functional immunity was not granted. Judges are 
of the view that functional immunity should not subside for 
international crimes as it would expose the state‟s internal 
administration to review by foreign courts. This would defeat the 
point of state sovereign equality along with the non- intervention 
principle. On the contrary, some scholars are of the view that 
rationemateriae should be removed from international crimes 
because it cannot be regarded as an official act. They believe that 
the continuance of immunity for international crimes will definitely 
decrease the importance of law and will create injustice.  
9. Rationale behind the Grant of Functional Immunity to 
International Organizations 
The main reason organizations claim functional immunity is to 
secure its independence. International organizations belong to 
ratified states and each of those states is entitled to immunity. 
International organizations with the support of functional 
immunity provide safeguards to all the ratified states. For efficient 
functioning and the maintenance of balance of power, 
organizations should be kept out of influence. Functional immunity 
stabilizes member states by ensuring equal distribution of power 
and decision management. International organizations cannot be 
regarded as states, because of the lack of territorial boundary and 
the fact that they have a judiciary of their own. In relation to the 
                                                          
40Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v Adolf Eichmann, [1968] 
36 ILR 277-342, specially 308-312. 
41Kovtunenko v U Law Yone, [1960] 31 ILR 259 ff. 




territory of operation too, organizations depend on sovereign 
member states, with limitations both geographical and operational. 
Therefore, functional immunity of sovereign states protects the 
mechanism of organizations altogether. Waiver of such immunity 
is very rare and the dispute settlement mechanism is weak.42 
Organizations enjoy functional immunity for the purposes of 
independent functioning however, the assumed restrictive premise 
of immunity turned out to be fairly wide and unrestricted. In the 
case of Dupree Associates Inc. v OAS,43where the action was brought 
against OAS in the U.S. District court, it was held that OAS enjoys 
immunity and was absolved from all charges. The court also held 
that organizations enjoy the same functional immunity as 
sovereign states. Additionally, in the case of Cynthia Brazak and 
Nasr Ishak v. the UN et al,44 the United Nations and its top officials 
were sued for sexual harassment. The American District Court and 
the Court of Appeal, both, gave the decision in favor of the United 
Nations as they enjoyed functional immunity from jurisdiction of 
the courts. It is not mandatory for an organization to be associated 
with the sovereign state, but an International Organization may 
have its own authority, for e.g. Even though the United States of 
America, is not a party to the International Organizations 
Immunities Act, 1945, yet the World Bank has provided functional 
immunity to the concerned state through the respective statue.45 
International organizations enjoy functional immunity based on 
diplomatic practices. Scholars have opined that the functional 
immunity granted to organizations should only be limited to their 
efficient and independent functioning. Some have even said that 
privileges and immunities should be strictly limited to their 
independent status and not be of a nature, which permits misuse. 
                                                          
42 Emmanuel Gaillard and Isabelle Pingel-Lenuzza, International 
Organizations and Immunity from Jurisdiction: To Restrict or to Bypass, 
51 (ICLQ, 2002). 
43 Dupree Associates Inc. v. OAS, [1982] 63 ILR 92. 
44 Cynthia Brazak and Nasr Ishak v. the UN et al., 551 F.Supp.2d 313 (2008 
U.S. District Court). 
45 International Organizations Immunities Act 1945, 22 U.S.C. §288a 
(“IOIA”). 
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10. Extent of Functional Immunity granted to Different 
Classes of State Officials  
10.1 High Ranking Officers, Diplomatic Agents and Officials on 
Special Mission 
High-ranking officials generally perform their duties in their own 
states and only occasionally in foreign states. The officials enjoy 
personal immunity and disputes regarding rationemateriae only 
arise scarcely. Operations performed by High-ranking officials on 
the forum state do not generally involve an infraction of criminal 
law of some other state. There are guidelines to prevent exercise of 
criminal jurisdiction, for example, the act of state doctrine or Forum 
non convenine. This means that no sovereign state can interfere with 
the independent functioning of the other sovereign state and it has 
to respect its judiciary and its decisions. In the case concerning the 
of the former Head of State Venezuela,46 his acts were not 
considered to be under the ambit of his official duty. Despite this, 
judges classified those acts as common crimes performed by 
officials by state doctrine. The proposition adopted by the Institut 
de Droit International (IDI) refers to immunity to officials from civil, 
criminal and administrative jurisdiction not as an exercise based on 
the nature of the act committed, but as one which ensures that there 
is only restricted interference in the discharge of the officials‟ 
duties. 
 The first category of officials who need functional immunity the 
most, is that of diplomatic agents. Such immunity is granted after 
taking into consideration the general practices resorted to by 
former diplomatic agents with regard to the performance of their 
official duties. Diplomatic officials enjoy a wide array of 
immunities, as they benefit from personal immunity which covers 
both personal and official acts, leading to the absorption of 
rationemateriae. These practices are more or less derived from the 
judgments of the courts and the Vienna Convention which gave it a 
black letter form enabling diplomats to enjoy both kinds of 
                                                          
46Jiminez v U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972, Supreme Court of 
United States). 




immunity.47 The next set of officials who are in need of functional 
immunity, consists of the various Heads of states, Heads of 
Governments, and Ministers and officials from the department of 
Foreign affairs. These officials enjoy functional immunity during 
the mandate. The scope and ambit of this immunity too, has to be 
inferred from the practice of the former head of states, 
governments and foreign minister with regard to the official acts 
performed, when they were in office. However, the grant of such 
immunity is relatively non-uniform and is granted only sparingly.48 
The last cateogry of officials refers to members on special missions. 
In 1969, the New York convention on special missions49 was constituted 
with the intention of later subsuming it with the permanent 
mission and it grants a balanced functional immunity similar to 
that granted to a diplomatic agent.50 However, in recent practice, 
functional immunity applies only after the completion of their 
mission. Sometimes the various bilateral and multilateral treaties 
usually aid the grant of functional immunity.  
10.2 Military Officers 
There is a lot of ambiguity as to the extent to which military 
officials enjoy functional immunity. Scholars believe that their 
immunity is strictly limited to their military duty in foreign states; 
others believe that immunity is limited to cover only criminal and 
disciplinary immunity, which is limited to the military force.51 The 
extent of the application of such immunity is still uncertain as most 
of the military operations in the foreign state are covered by 
bilateral treaties or multilateral treaties, for example, Status of Force 
agreements. The exercise of jurisdiction varies from treaties to 
                                                          
47Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, art. 38, art. 
39(2), 500 UNTS 95. 
48Regina v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte 
Pinochet Ugarte („Pinochet III‟) [1999] 119 ILM 136 ff. 
49Convention on Special Missions, Arts. 24-31, December 8, 1969, 1400 
UNTS 231. 
50Khurts Bat v Investigating Judge of the Federal Court of Germany, [2011] 
EWHC 2029 (Admin) and (2012) 3 Weekly L Rep 180. 
51G P Barton, „Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity from Criminal Jurisdiction’, 
186-234 (31 edn, British YB Intl L, 1950); H Fox, The Law of State Immunity, 
717 (2nd edn, OUP, 2008). 
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treaties. Where some treaties grant exclusive jurisdiction to sending 
states, some others grant immunity to the receiving state. 
Sometimes concurrent jurisdiction is also given to both the sending 
and receiving states. Although in recent practice, the sending state 
has priority over the receiving state in relation to jurisdiction, it is 
more balanced than the grant of functional immunity to diplomatic 
agents. This view can be substantiated by the judgment in case of 
Ship Enrica Lexie52 between India and Italy. The court herein,  
rejected the defendant‟s pleadings that marines enjoy functional 
immunity and observed that the same is dependent on the treaties 
between the respective sending and receiving states.  
In matters relating to the armed forces, where the military is a 
beneficiary of the functional immunity, despite residing on a 
temporary or permanent basis, it is governed by many bilateral or 
multilateral treaties. These treaties or agreements provide exclusive 
jurisdictions over its forces. There is neither reference of any 
customary rule regarding rationemateriae nor exemption from 
jurisdiction for armed force, from their official acts.53 After the 1951 
London agreement between the states, on North Atlantic Treaties 
regarding position of officials,54Article VII of the agreement allowed 
the host state to exercise criminal jurisdiction over military officials 
for the violation of domestic rules. It was drafted not to give an 
exemption of immunity, but to allocate jurisdiction between 
sending state and receiving state.  
10.3 Consular Agents 
Consular agents also enjoy functional immunity for acts performed 
in the exercise of their functions. The Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations, 196355 governs the immunity of consular 
officials. Article 43 affirms that rationemateriae is attached to 
consular functions. The U.S. State department has also stated that 
there should be no proceedings in relation to the accepted consular 
                                                          
52Latorre and others v Union of India and Others, (2012) 252 KLR 794. 
53 G.P. Barton, Foreign armed forces: Immunity from criminal jurisdiction, 186, 
192-93 (27 edn, Brit, Y.B. INT‟L L, 1950). 
54 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, April 4, 1951. 
55 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 22, 1963, art. 43, 596 
U.N.T.S. 261. 




functions in the realm of official duty. The Paris court in the case of 
Bigelow v. Zizianoff,56 recognized that functional immunity exists 
only for the acts done in relation to their consular functions. The 
major case in this regard is that of Abu Omar57 where it was 
determined that the scope of immunity for consular officials is 
limited to their administrative duty with regard to the laws of the 
territorial state. Another such case is that of Rissmann,58 wherein a 
consular agent of Germany was charged for defaulting passports. 
The Italian Courts, however, held that issuing passports is a typical 
consular function. Conclusively, functional immunity is granted to 
consular officials only for the discharge of typical consular 
functions, as envisaged by the Vienna Convention. 
11. Conclusion 
In relation to the extensive study mentioned herein above, the only 
conclusion that can be drawn is that there are no general customary 
norms or any principles regarding functional immunity that are 
applicable to state officials. However, there are norms that are 
applicable to specific state officials with respect to their official 
duties. It is lucid that official acts are covered under functional 
immunity, but it is still a question of fact and law, especially, if the 
offence is grave in nature. The limits of official capacity are not 
defined in law. It is to be ascertained by facts of each case. Consent 
of the states plays a major role in granting functional immunity, in 
its absence there will be no authority providing functional 
immunity to the official. This radical change in the nature of 
functional immunity is because of the numerous doctrinal 
approaches derived to operate functional immunity for the state 
officials who act on behalf of state.  
The major misconception about functional immunity is that 
immunity to state officials is an organ of state in itself. That the acts 
of officials are not attributable individually, but to the state itself is 
a false premise, as the evolution of functional immunity with 
                                                          
56 Bigelow v. Zizianoff, [1932] 4 I.L.R. 384.   
57Proc. Gen. Appello Milano, Sez v Penale: Nasr Osama Mustafá Hassan 
detto Abu Omar e altri, [2013] 96 Rivista di dirittointernazionale 272 ff. 
58 In re Rissmann [1994] 71 I.L.R. 577. 
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regard to international crimes brought normativity in the legal 
regime of international law and introduced a principle wherein, 
those acts are attributable even to individuals. Therefore, the 
functional immunity enjoyed by state officials is limited and also 
coincides with officials who enjoy personal immunity.   
The prior foundation of functional immunity no longer exists, as 
the immunity granted to state officials for their acts is obsolete. 
Today, the state officials, because of the duties that concern 
extrinsic issues of the state, have a power of functional immunity. 
The duties of state officials should not be considered as the true 
rendition of the state, in relation to other states. Generally, officials 
enjoy personal immunity which provides them with more 
exemptions than that provided by functional immunity, during 
their mandate. It is also reasonable that functional immunity, albeit 
less important, should be bound to shield officials even after the 
end of their mandate. It should also protect officials who do or do 
not represent state internationally but act on behalf of the state. The 
extent of functional immunity is limited only to protect certain 
specific functions of the State in foreign territories, through the 
protection offered to state officials performing their duties on 
behalf of the state. This should predominantly be dependent on the 
efficiency with which the officials discharge their duties.  
 
 
